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I. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL:
Appellants have appealed the variances granted by Clearwater County to Ed and Carole
Galloway, identified as ZV2011-2.

Petitioners raise three issues on appeal:

1.

Do Appellants have standing?

2.

Did the Board's decision prejudice Appellants' substantial rights?

3.

Did the Board error in a manner that requires reversal pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 67-5279(3)? Specifically Appellants argue:
a.

Insufficient evidence was presented to support a finding of "an undue
hardship because of characteristics of the site."

b.

No relevant findings of fact were made as to whether the requested
variances would be "injurious to other property in the area in which the
property is situated".

c.

The Board exceeded its statutory authority by adjudicating the rights of the
parties with respect to the easement (access road for the subdivision).

d.

Denial by the Board of County Commissioners of the Appellants
administrative appeal was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion
because the hardship claimed by the developer was self inflicted.

II.

PRIOR PROCEEDINGS:

Ed and Carole Galloway (hereinafter Galloway(s)) purchased a 100 acre aliquot parcel of
land, located in a remote area of Clearwater County, in approximately 1985. (R. p. 34.) The
property is located within a rural sparsely populated area of Clearwater County. (See photographs
R. p. 126 - 134) On September 1, 1998, Galloways were granted an access easement, 30 feet in

total width (15 feet each side of a described centerline) from the Appellant's predecessor in
1

interest, recorded in the property records of Clearwater Count as Instrument 180090. (R. p. 70 71)
On May 23,2006, Galloway filed with Clearwater County an application to subdivide the
property into ten (10) parcels ranging between six (6) plus acres and twelve (12) plus acres in
size. The applicants utilized the Class B combined plat procedure identified in the Clearwater
County Subdivision Ordinance. The subdivision was eventually identified as Southfork Estates.
(R. p. 107).
Galloway, on January 11,2011, filed an application for three variances from the
Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance, Galloway sought to vary the requirement of
Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance Article 4.D.2, which requires access roads to be built
within a minimum sixty (60) foot wide right-of-way; to vary the requirements of Clearwater
County Subdivision Ordinance Article 4.DA.d, which requires access roads to have a minimum
twenty-four (24) foot road surface or finished width; and to vary the requirement of Article 4.B
of the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance, which requires all arterial, collector, and other
streets in a proposed subdivision to be dedicated to the public. (R. p. 61)
It is important to note that the property being subdivided is properly zoned for such a

subdivision request, and the variances sought focus solely on the nature of the access road.
Galloways at no time sought to vary the zoning of the land (authorized land use), but merely
sought to vary the requirements applicable to a single access road. What Galloways sought was a
variance from a subdivision ordinance, not a zoning ordinance.
2

The Commission, following a disputed public hearing held on March 21,2011, at which
Galloway and Appellants were present and provided evidence and testimony, granted Galloway
each of the requested variances, documented by written findings of fact and conclusions oflaw,
dated April 4, 2011.

CR. p.

135.)

By Clearwater County Ordinance, the Planning and Zoning Commission has final
authority to determine whether or not to grant a variance, and the ordinance requires no further
factual public hearing in front of the Board of County Commissioners. Any appeal of that grant
of variance must be made to the Board of County Commissioners, which hears the appeal as a
quasi-judicial board. Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance, Article VII, Section A; Article
IX, Section G.
On March 25,2011, Petitioners filed a notice of appeal of those variance grants,
challenging the Planning and Zoning Commissions findings. They stated as grounds for appeal
that no facts or testimony were presented which would authorize the issuances of a variance
under the terms and conditions of the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance. Further, that
the easement which the Galloways propose to use for access to the property does not allow that
road to be utilized for easement for ingress and egress for parties other than Mr. and Mrs.
Galloway. Finally, that it is not appropriate for a variance to be granted from the requirement
that access to the subdivision be dedicated for public use.

CR. p. 29.)

The Clearwater County Board of Commissioners, sitting as a quasi judicial board, heard
the appeal and issued an order remanding the matter to the Planning and Zoning Commission for
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further findings pursuant to a written order dated July 29,2011. (R. p. 147.)
Upon remand, the Commission held a subsequent public hearing on August 15,2011,
took additional testimony and evidence, and granted the requested variances a second time
pursuant to a written decision setting forth the applicable law and findings of fact, dated
September 6,2011. (R. p. 140.)
Appellants filed a second notice of appeal dated August 31, 2011, appealing the decision
of the Commission to the Board of County Commissioners. (R. p. 34.)
As grounds for appeal, the appellants argued that the applicant, Galloway, presented
insufficient evidence to authorize the issuance of a variance. Also that any undue hardship was
of Galloway's own making, because the property was purchased in 1985, when the existing
standards were in place, and hardship of the applicant's own making cannot be the grounds for
the granting of a variance. (R. p. 34.)
A third issue raised in the appellant's first notice of appeal (which was held by the Board
of County Commissioners pending remand to the Commission), that the access easement itself
does not allow for subdivision of the Galloway property. (R. p. 34 - 35)
Appellants re-asserted as grounds for appeal that it is not appropriate for a variance to be
granted from the requirement that the access road be dedicated for public use. (R. p. 35)
The Board of County Commissioners, following a hearing, denied the second appeal and
filed a written decision, dated November 21,2011. (R. p. 156)
The Board then finally granted approval of the subdivision plat, by written order, dated
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December 19, 2011. (R. p. 165)
Appellants then filed a Petition for Judicial Review. (R. p. 4.) Appellants asked the
District Court to review the prior proceedings, arguing again that no facts were presented which
would justify the issuance of a variance, that the easement itself does not allow the access road to
be utilized for subdivision purposes, and that it isn't proper to vary the requirement that the road
be dedicated to the public. (R. p. 9)
Briefing was filed by both parties, and the District Court upon argument, sua sponte,
issued an opinion finding the Appellants lacked standing in that the Appellants could not show a
particularized degree of harm. (R. p. 4) The District Court did not address Appellants other
Issues.
Appellants subsequently filed this action before the Idaho Supreme Court.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

In an appeal from a district court, where the court was acting in its appellate capacity
under IDAPA, the Supreme Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's
decision. Cowan v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 P.3d 1247,
1254 (2006).
As to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, the appellate Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the zoning agency. The Court must defer to the agency's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous; and the agency's factual determinations are
5

binding on the reviewing court, even when there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so
long as the determinations are supported by evidence in the record. Payette River Prop. Owners

Ass'n v. Bd ofComm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 554, 976 P.2d 477, 480 (1999).
Planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity, including a
board's application and interpretation of its own zoning ordinances. Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508,
148 P.3d at 1254.
The Court shall affirm the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds that the agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (a) in excess of constitutional or statutory
provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful
procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(2); Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508, 148 P.3d at
1254. The party attacking a zoning board's action must first illustrate that the board erred in a
manner specified therein and then must show that a substantial right of the party has been
prejudiced. Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 452, 180 P.3d 487,491 (2008).
I.C. § 67-5279 provides the primary guidance to Courts when hearing judicial review
petitions or appeals from County planning and zoning decisions. It provides as follows:
(1) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of
the evidence on questions of fact.
(2) When the agency was not required by the provisions of this chapter or by other
provisions of law to base its action exclusively on a record, the court shall affirm the
agency action unless the court finds that the action was:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
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(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and
remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions ofthis chapter or by other provisions
oflaw to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that
the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
( c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and
remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency
action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS:

STANDING:
Have Appellants shown that a substantial right may be prejudiced by approval of the

requested variances?
To gain standing, one must be an "affected person" as contemplated under LLUP A. An
"affected person" is "one having an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by
the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development." I.e. § 67-6521(1)(a). To have
standing in a land-use case, the petitioner needs to allege, not prove, only that the development
could potentially harm his or her real estate interests. Evans v. Teton Cnty., 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73
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P.3d 84, 89 (2003). Standing has been found to exist, for example, where the possibility of odor
being detected by a landowner three miles from a wastewater treatment plant was alleged
Davisco Foods Int'l, Inc. v. Gooding Cnty., 141 Idaho 784, 786-87, 118 P.3d 116, 118-19

(2005). Also more recently where the grant of permission to construct new homes may possibly
exceed the scope of the access easement over property owned by the appellant, and may affect
emergency vehicles and may lead to gates enclosing cattle being left open. Hawkins v.
Bonneville County Bd. of Com Irs, 151 Idaho 228, 231-32, 254 P.3d 1224, 1227-28 (2011).

While Clearwater County does not concede that grounds alleged by Appellants to
establish standing are ultimately provable, Clearwater County concedes that Appellants have
alleged a sufficient possibility of harm to establish standing to bring this appeal.

B.

DUE PROCESS / EXCEEDING AUTHORITY:
Appellants argue that Clearwater County improperly adjudicated the respective easement

rights between themselves and the developer Galloway, and therefore denied them their right of
due process, and exceed its legal authority. This argument was raised at the Board of County
Commissioners appeal level, and was responded to by the Board as follows:
"In the context of planning and zoning, it is not the practice or policy of the
Clearwater County Planning and Zoning Commission, or the Board of Commissioners, to
become embroiled in disputes between landowners regarding the intent of easements
which have been granted. The County looks at the bare language of the easement itself,
and if that language appears clear and unambiguous to the County, sufficient to provide a
right of access to the proposed subdivision, the County will not delve further into the
intent of the parties regarding that easement. The Clearwater County planning and zoning
structure is not intended, nor shall be utilized, as a substitute for a court of law to resolve
easement disputes between landowners.
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Courts recognize this approach when interpreting easements in general: "In
construing an easement in a particular case, the instrument granting the easement is to be
interpreted in connection with the intention of the parties, and the circumstances in
existence at the time the easement was granted and utilized. Dr. James Cool, D.D.S. v.
Mountainview Landowners Co-op. Ass'n, Inc., 139 Idaho 770, 773, 86 P.3d 484,487
(2004) The existence of ambiguity determines the standard of review of a lower court's
interpretation of a contract or instrument. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ethington Family Trust,
137 Idaho 435, 437-38,50 P.3d 450, 452-53 (2002).
In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary
and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the
instrument. See Juker v. American Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644, 645, 637 P.2d 792
793 (1981). C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001).
The easement in question (Appeal Record Section 13) provides a bare,
unequivocal grant of non-exclusive easements to Galloway, and Galloway'S heirs,
successors and assigns, with the only limitation being as follows: "This Grant of
Easements is binding upon and ensures to the benefit of the heirs, assigns, and successors
of the parties hereto, and the easement for ingress and egress shall not be deemed a public
right-of-way."
"Public right-of-way" is a term of art, defined in Idaho Code Section 40-117 (9) as
a right of way open to the public and under the jurisdiction of the public highway agency,
where the agency has no obligation to construct or maintain the same. With the grant of
a variance to Galloway allowing the access road to remain a private, rather than a public
road, then the easement appears on its face for planning and zoning purposes, to allow for
development.
This is not meant nor is to be construed as a finding based upon a disputed hearing
as to the intent of the parties to the easement itself, but is to be construed as a finding
solely for agency planning and zoning purposes. R. p. 18.
Appellants point to Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790, 264 P .3d 897 (2011) for the
proposition that any time an interested party objects to a subdivision application on the grounds
that the easement access does not allow for subdivision, then the County must stay all
proceedings pending the filing and completion of a lawsuit in the District Court. Further, the
County must do so automatically, without even a basic review of the bare, plain language of the
easement itself. Clearwater County respectfully submits this is a mis-reading of the holding in
9

Jasso.
Jasso involves a request for permission to build homes on real property accessed by a
road which Camas County required per its subdivision ordinances to be public. There was a
dispute as to whether or not the road was indeed public. The Jasso Court held specifically as
follows:
"Although not necessary to our decision today, we provide the following guidance on
remand as to the provisions of the Subdivision Ordinance relevant to the parties' dispute.
If a land use application is submitted and proper access to the land is disputed,
the decision-maker should make the application's approval expressly contingent
upon judicial resolution of the access issue. The parties dispute whether a "road
and utility easement for ingress and egress" is sufficient in scope to permit public
access to the proposed subdivision. The Board correctly determined that it lacks
jurisdiction to determine the easement's nature and scope, as questions of property
ownership must be resolved by a district court. Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd of
Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 842,993 P.2d 596, 605 (1999). Since article V, § B(1)
of the Subdivision Ordinance requires that subdivisions with five or more lots
have access to a public street or road, the Board may not approve the subdivision
application until such access is certain. Thus, the Board may condition approval of
the subdivision application upon a district court's entry of declaratory or final
judgment that the easement provides the subdivision with the necessary access to
a public road. See McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 923,88 P.3d 740, 742
(2004) (affirming district court's judgment as to easement's scope after county
commissioners made approval of conditional use permit expressly contingent
upon judicial resolution of scope of the easement)."

Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790, 797, 264 P.3d 897, 904 (2011)
First, the Jasso language relied on by Appellants is fact specific to the Jasso case, and is
specifically identified as not necessary for the decision made, but is merely guidance to Camas
County on remand. While Clearwater County has a similar requirement that the subdivision be
accessed by a public road, Clearwater County granted a variance for this subdivision (see
10

discussion below) varying the requirement that the access easement be dedicated to the public.
Appellants then argued the easement as varied would not allow for subdivision of the property,
i.e., arguing the intent of the parties granting an unrestricted private easement for ingress and
egress.
This matter differs from Jasso in that Appellants wish to extend fact specific remand
dicta relating to whether or not a road is public to encompass all private access easement issues
in all planning and zoning cases statewide, merely upon an unsupported allegation that the
easement itself does not mean what the bare language of the easement states. Appellants
forward this argument while steadfastly refusing, even though being invited, to file any quiet title
action in District Court.
The specific issue in Jasso was actually whether or not the County improperly approved
the subdivision while conditionally holding that no building permits would issue until the access
issue was resolved, thereby removing the matter from public comment. Again, the quoted
language was not necessary to resolve that issue. See Appellant's Brief, Stephen V. JASSO, and
Curtis and Carnie Gorringe, husband and wife, Petitioners-Respondents, v. CAMAS COUNTY
IDAHO, a political subdivision of the State ofIdaho, Defendant-Appellant., 2010 WL 3497345
(Idaho), 21-22
The Catch 22:
When reviewing any subdivision application a County must conduct a bare review of the
applicant's right to use an access road, whether private or public, to ensure the ordinance
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requirements have been met. The application procedure requires "proof of adequate access to a
public street". Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance 34 Section G (l)(d).

Further,

Clearwater County must complete the hearing process within a specified time frame:
"All Class A & Class B subdivisions must have the hearing process completed within six
(6) months of the first Planning and Zoning commission hearing date. All other
applications must have the hearing process completed within three (3) months of the first
Planning and Zoning Commission hearing date."
Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance 34, Article III, Section B.
This time requirement in the ordinance arises from an State mandate. I.C. 67-6521 ( c)
provides:
After a hearing, the commission or governing board may:
(i) Grant or deny an application; or
(ii) Delay such a decision for a definite period of time for further study or hearing.
Each commission or governing board shall establish by ordinance or resolution a
time period within which a recommendation or decision must be made.
To adopt a ruling as requested by Appellants would mean that no County could finalize
the hearing process as ordinance and statute require, so long as any interested party to the
subdivision proceeding challenged the intent of the parties to the access easement, no matter how
spurious that challenge may be.
Secondly, the argument would prohibit the County from engaging in a review of the
access easements at all, which puts the County at odds with its own ordinances reasonably
requiring such a review.
While it is true that Clearwater County does not have authority to finally determine
12

respective property rights between landowners, Clearwater County must conduct a limited review
of those rights with respect to easements. Clearwater County recognized this limited review
obligation, and went to great pains to explain its position, including stating specifically that its
decision was for administrative planning and zoning purposes, and is in no way to be deemed a
substitute for a court of law decision. The Shinns have always, and indeed still have the ability
to file a quiet title action in District Court.
If they prevail, the District Court opinion will obviously trump or overtum any
subdivision approval of Clearwater County. By refusing to file such an action instead relying on
the planning and zoning process to forward their claim that the easement is inadequate for
subdividing, the Appellants have created the very situation about which they now complain, and
have utilized the same process to arguably reach the result they dispute, i.e. interruption of
property rights of parties by Clearwater County, rather than the District Court, only the
interruption would be of the Galloway's property rights.
What if Clearwater County were to deny the subdivision request following a grant of a
variance to allow the access road to remain private, because Appellants claimed the easement
intent would prohibit subdivision, keeping in mind that Clearwater County must have the process
completed within three months of the first hearing by Planning and Zoning of the variance
application? Under the Appellants' suggested approach, then Galloway would have cause to
claim that Clearwater County unreasonably and without lawful authority engaged in
interpretation of Galloway's property rights.
13

What would be created is an untenable position for the County, who is mandated to reach
a final decision within a specific time period, while also being subject to a mandate not to reach a
final decision.
Clearwater County submits that more appropriate guidance to a planning and zoning
board should be as follows: First, the Court should recognize that when reviewing a subdivision
application, Clearwater County has an obligation to conduct a limited review to ensure proper
access exists, and to do so within the required time frames, i.e., do the recorded documents on
their face provide clear and unambiguous qualifying access to the property being subdivided.
Second, the Court should also recognize that such a review is for administrative purposes only,
and should an interested party file a proper lawsuit to specifically identify the relative property
rights of the parties, that holding is controlling.

C.

DID THE BOARD ERR IN A MANNER THAT REOUIRES REVERSAL
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE SECTION 67-5279?

1.

Appellants argue an incorrect standard of law: That insufficient evidence
was presented to support a finding of "an undue hardship because of characteristics
of the site." per Idaho Code Section 67-6516.
Appellant's reliance on Idaho Code Section 67-6516 is misplaced.
Title 67-6501 et. seq. (the Local Land Use Planning Act, or LLUPA) is the primary
delegation of land use planning and regulation to the Counties.

The Idaho Court of Appeals, in

Worley Hwy. Dist. vs. Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 833, 663 P.2d 1135 (Ct. App. 1983),
succinctly summarized this delegation of the police power as follows: "In enacting the Local
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Planning Act of 1975, the legislature intended to give local governing boards broad powers in the
area of planning and zoning."
I.e. §67-6511 provides a mandate that each county establish zoning districts, setting
regulations for construction standards or use of buildings, lot occupancy, size of lots, open
spaces, and other uses. In addition, I.C. §67-6513 requires each county to provide by ordinance
standards and processes for applications for subdivision permits. At issue here are applications
for subdivision permits and variances from those requirements.
There is a distinct difference between land use zones and subdivisions. Both Idaho
statutes and Clearwater County ordinances deal with them separately (zoning ordinances are
found in Ordinance 35B, subdivision ordinances are found in Ordinance 34). This distinction is
importmlt because the Idaho Code provision (I.C. §67-6516) that the petitioner claims is in
conflict with the Clearwater County subdivision ordinances applies to zoning only, not
subdivisions. Specifically:
"Each governing board shall provide, as part of the zoning ordinance, for the processing
of applications for variance permits ... " I.C. §67-6516.
At issue here is a subdivision application, not a zoning issue.
For example, a similar argument was made in Blaha v. Bd. ofAda County Com/rs, 134
Idaho 770, 9 P.3d 1236 (2000), in which the petitioners argued that Ada County had no authority
to grant a variance to road width, placement and design issues because those were outside the
scope ofI.C. §67-6516. The Court held:
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" As defined in the Local Land Use Planning Act, a variance is a modification of the bulk
and placement requirements of the zoning ordinance as to lot configuration or building
size and location. I.C. § 67-6516. The variances to intersection design, road width and
grade specifications, which are involved here but not itemized in the statute, are therefore
not governed by the standards found in 1. C. §67-6516."

Blaha 134 Idaho at 774, 9P.3d at 1240.
In short, Idaho counties are required to provide ordinances establishing standards for
subdivisions (I.C. §67-6513). Implicit in this authority to establish standards is the authority to
establish a procedure to vary those standards. That procedure is not the procedure set out in I.C.
§67-6516, which applies only to zoning issues. Idaho counties have authority to establish their
own variance procedures for subdivisions.
Clearwater County has done so. CCSO Article VIII sets for the criteria for granting a

subdivision variance. It provides specifically as follows:
Section A. Purpose: The Commission may grant, as a result of unique circumstances
such as topographical-physical limitations or a planned unit deVelopment, a variance, as
herein defined, from the provisions of this Ordinance on a finding that undue hardship
results from the strict compliance with specific provisions of requirements of this
Ordinance or that the application of such requirements or provision is impracticable.
Section B. Findings: No variance, as herein defined, shall be favorably acted upon by the
Commission unless there is a finding, as a result of a public hearing, that all of the
following exist:
1. That there are such special circumstances or conditions affecting the property
that the strict application of the provisions of this Ordinance would clearly be
impracticable or unreasonable and cause and undue hardship.
2. That strict compliance with the requirements of the Ordinance would result in
extraordinary topography, or such other conditions would result in inhibiting the
achievement ofthe objectives of the Ordinance.
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3. That the granting of the specified variance will not be detrimental to the public
welfare or injurious to other property in the area in which the property is situated.
4. That such variance will not violate the provisions of the Idaho Code.
5. That such variance will not have the effect of nullifYing the interest and purpose
of this Ordinance and the Comprehensive Plan.
As discussed above, I.C. §67-6516 does not apply to subdivisions, including requests for
variances in subdivision ordinances. However, even if it did, the Appellants' definition of "site"
in the context of Clearwater County's ordinances is in error. While no specific definition of
"site" exists in Clearwater County Ordinance (indeed the subdivision variance ordinance
discusses conditions "affecting the property"), it is clear from other contexts that access roads are
to be considered part of the "site" or are conditions "affecting the property".
For example, a subdivision application requires a subdivision plat map identifYing the
property being subdivided together with access roads and easements, whether public or private,
connecting that property to a public street. Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance Article III,
Section 1. 18
The definition of "map" includes access roads. Clearwater County Subdivision
Ordinance Article II, Definitions.
Design standards for interior roads in a subdivision, as well as exterior access roads, are
specified. Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance Article 4, Section D.
It is clear that the term "site", if applied to a subdivision under the Clearwater County

Subdivision scheme, includes access roads and easements.
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2.

Applying the correct standard, a sufficient factual basis was established for a
finding of "undue hardship".

Undue hardship, as contemplated by the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance, is not
defined either in the Ordinance or in the Idaho Code. There exists limited guidance in State law,
and that guidance is provided generally within the context of variances from zoning decisions
rather than subdivisions. Ultimately, this Court is instructed to provide planning and zoning
decisions a strong presumption of validity, including the agency's application and interpretation
of its own zoning ordinances.
Thus, what constitutes an undue hardship depends on how the Planning and Zoning
Commission and the Board of County Commissioners interpret that term, rather than how Courts
interpret that term, and so long as the County's decision is not arbitrary, it cannot be reversed on
these grounds.
In determining how to define "undue hardship" Clearwater County did not act arbitrarily.
Clearwater County looked to other bodies of law to help define the term, stating as follows:
"The requirement to show an "undue hardship" exists in State statute as well (I.C.
67-5279). There exists limited guidance from state ofIdaho statutes or case law as to
what constitutes an "undue hardship". Undue hardship is some condition which is
analyzed on a case by case basis (Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 207 P.3d
998 (2009) due to characteristics of the site (Wohrle at 147 Idaho 273-274; 207 P.3d
1004-05), or due to special circumstances or conditions, which are peculiar to the
property and not applicable generally to land or buildings in the neighborhood (Burley v.
McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 909, 693 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Idaho App., 1984), and
which is not in conflict with the public interest. I.C. § 67-5279. An undue hardship can
be created due to exorbitant expense of a requirement not justified by the development,
such as with respect to excessive road construction requirements to support a relatively
few number of daily vehicle trips caused by the development (see Blaha v. Board ofAda
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County Com 'rs, 134 Idaho 770, 773, 9 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Idaho 2000) for a Board of
County Commissioners finding of undue hardship due to an expense vs. benefit analysis,
cited with approval by the reviewing court)." Decision of Board of County
Commissioners on Appeal, R. p. 159.

While many of the cases reviewed by Clearwater County dealt with zoning issues, rather
than subdivision issues, one case (Blaha supra) discussed not only subdivision issues, but road
design and specifications. In Blaha, the developer sought a variance from Ada County relating to
road design and construction, arguing that it was unduly restrictive to require extensive
re-alignment and grading of a private road providing access to a proposed subdivision when the
anticipated traffic would be only eighty trips per day. The developer had previously obtained a
waiver of those requirements from the Ada County Highway District, and subsequently sought a
variance from the Ada County Planning and Zoning Commission.
In Blaha, the Ada County Board of Commissioners found that strict enforcement of the
Ada County Highway District policies would require road work and expense not justified by a
development generating only eighty vehicle trips per day. Blaha v. Bd. ofAda County Com'rs,
134 Idaho 770, 773, 9 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2000)
The Blaha court ultimately found the petition for a variance to the County was
unnecessary because the Ada County Highway District had primary authority to waive the road
design requirements and had done so prior to the variance being granted. Implicit in this finding
is the conclusion that the cost and expense of road construction compared to the benefit to be
gained from the road construction is a proper analysis.
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Regardless, whether a cost/benefit analysis is appropriate in Clearwater County for a
variance of a Clearwater County subdivision requirement is a determination to be made by
Clearwater County, not the Court.

It is important to keep in mind the context of this case. We are not talking about a
landowner wanting to use his property in violation of use restrictions. This is a case where
Galloway wants to use their property for the same purpose as the Appellants, i.e., for
single-family residential purposes. At issue here is merely the access road from a public road
(Middle Road) to the Galloway's property itself, and its width and nature (public vs. private).
The Planning and Zoning Commission found, pursuant to the order dated April 4, 2011
(R. p. 135), and the order dated September 6, 2011, (R. p. 140), that Galloway had presented
sufficient evidence to authorize the issuance of the requested variances.
The Planning and Zoning Commission made detailed and exhaustive findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect to the ordinance elements of a subdivision variance. Those are
found following the heading FINDINGS OF FACT (R. p. 142). Due to the length, they are not
set forth herein.
In addition to the testimony highlighted by the Planning and Zoning Commission's
decision, staff investigation reports incorporated into the decision by reference further document
the facts leading to a finding of undue hardship. (R. p. 91 - 106)
Appellants first argue that an expense vs. benefit analysis in consideration of a request for
a variance from subdivision requirements is inappropriate, arguing that City ofBurley v.
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McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906,693 P.2d 1108 (Ct. App. 1984) holds as such.
City of Burley does not apply to this situation. First, City ofBurley considered a zoning
variance rather than a subdivision variance. The property in Burley was zoned for only single or
double residential use. The landowner wanted to remodel a building from a duplex to a triplex, g
use not authorized in the particular zone in which the land was situated. As City of Burley
involved a zoning variance (as opposed to subdivision), the Burley court properly focused as the
controlling law on I. C. § 67-6516, stating:
The next question is whether the zoning board properly granted the variance for a triplex.
Idaho Code § 67-6516 provides that a variance "may be granted ... only upon a showing
of undue hardship because of characteristics of the site and that the variance is not in
conflict with the public interest."

City of Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 909, 693 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Ct.
App.1984)
Here, Galloway seeks to subdivide the property into multiple ten-acre lots for residential
purposes. This is a use of the property entirely permitted by the Clearwater County zoning
ordinances. The subdivision ordinances of Clearwater County exist merely to ensure orderly
development for authorized uses, not to establish which use is proper or improper. Clearwater
County Subdivision Ordinance Article 1, Section C. Purpose.
As the Blaha (supra) court established, I.C. § 67-6516 does not apply to subdivision
variance requests, only to zoning variance requests. The controlling ordinances then are those
established by Clearwater County, as interpreted by Clearwater County, which applies a cost /
benefit analysis as part of the process (not the exclusive analysis, but certainly part of it). Other
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language from the Blaha court, quoting an Ada County Planning and Zoning finding that the
exorbitant cost of the road construction, compared to the small anticipated benefit, leads again to
the conclusion that a cost / benefit analysis is appropriate in the context of subdivision
ordinances and roads.
Regardless, the decision granting Galloway a variance for certain access road issues was
not solely based on a cost/benefit analysis. The impossibility of obtaining a larger easement, the
rural nature of the area not lending itself to further development, the adequacy of the road to
handle the anticipated traffic, the approval of the road as varied by the local ambulance district,
the local fire district, and the County highway department, are all examples which when coupled
with the exorbitant and unnecessary cost of developing a road under the circumstances as they
exist with the Galloway subdivision were all properly considered by the Commission when
granting the variance.
Appellants also argue that any undue hardship was created by Galloway, citing Dawson

Enterprises, Inc. V Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977) for the proposition that
self inflicted undue hardship cannot be considered when granting a variance. Specifically, this
argument boils down to an assertion that since Galloway purchased the land in question in 1985,
at a time when the existing ordinances were in effect; therefore, he caused his own hardship by
purchasing land knowing development would require a variance.

Dawson does not apply to this situation, and furthermore Dawson does not hold that
self-created undue hardships automatically mean that no variance can be granted, but is merely a
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single factor to be considered - in a zoning change case. As Dawson is a zoning variance case
involving 1. C. §67 -6516 (discussed above). It is not applicable to the issue of a subdivision
vanance.
In Dawson, the applicant owned an option to purchase land zoned for agricultural and
residential uses only. Dawson filed a request for a land use change (zoning change), seeking to
have the parcel covered by his option zoned as commercial for use as an automobile dealership.
He then gambled on gaining the zoning change, exercised his purchase option, bought the land,
and claimed (among other things) that an undue financial hardship would now arise if the zoning
change was not allowed because the property would be worth far less than he paid for it.
Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 516, 567 P.2d 1257, 1267 (1977).
Dawson presents facts very different from this case. First, Dawson is a zoning case,
where the use being requested by the petitioner was not allowed. Unlike Dawson, the use
intended by Galloway has been allowed for well over thirty years, and was allowed at the time he
purchased the property over twenty years ago. Galloway requested a variance merely to change
the road easement and width requirements incidental to an already allowed use.
Second, Dawson involves an analysis of "spot zoning", something entirely absent from
this case. Changing the land use for a specific parcel of land to something the entire
neighborhood is not zoned for presents a very different question than obtaining a variance for a
road easement and width to support an already authorized and allowed use. Spot zoning is
something the Dawson court spent significant time discussing. Of note, all cases citing Dawson
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involve spot zoning or requests for variances to change land use entirely, rather than variances
for roads incidental to an already authorized land use.
Over twenty years elapsed before Galloway sought to subdivide his property. Dawson
filed a request for a zoning change, and then purchased the property intentionally to create an
undue hardship.
Appellants further argue that the Clearwater County Board of Commissioners "correctly
concluded that the self-inflicted nature of an undue hardship is a factor for consideration", a
matter not considered by Planning and Zoning, it failed to remand the case to Planning and
Zoning for further hearings. (Appellant' Brief p. 22)
First, Appellants failed to raise the issue of undue hardship at the Planning and Zoning
level.
Second, this misstates the decision of the Board of County Commissioners. The Board
described at length why Dawson, and the self inflicted nature of a hardship did not apply to a
subdivision variance request, nor to the facts of this case, ultimately stating:

"Dawson and those cases cited therein go on to describe that self inflicted hardship, if it
exists, is a factor in whether or not to grant or deny a variance, but is not controlling.
Therefore, this Board of Commissioners cannot say that the Planning and Zoning
Commission abused its discretion when deciding to grant the variances in spite of the
argument of self inflicted hardship and finds in favor of Galloway on this issue." ( R. p.
17)
At no time did the Board identify a self inflicted hardship as being a factor to be
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considered in the context of the Clearwater County subdivision ordinances.

3.

Sufficient findings of fact were made as to whether the requested variances
would be "detrimental to the public welfare or injurious to other property in
the area in which the property is situated".

The Planning and Zoning Commission has entered two written decisions in this matter,
dated April 4, 2011 (R. p. 135) and September 6, 2011 (R. p. 149), following public hearings. In
both decisions the proper ordinance is identified. In both decisions, a specific holding is made
that the ordinance conditions were met.
In the first decision, the P&Z Commission recites evidence received from Galloway that:
"The public welfare is not impacted at all since the changes will not have an impact on
emergency vehicles. Nor will it impact other owners in the area as the design and
implementation is entirely within parameters of the deeded RlW [right of way] and the
original (approved) plat. Carole and I are doing this low density sub with applicable
CC&Rs to limit impact on the neighbors both visually and physically." R. p. 137.
In the second decision, the P&Z Commission added the following:
"The purpose of the subdivision ordinances in general are set forth in Article I, Section C
of the Subdivision Ordinance and is not re-printed here. The Commission finds strict
compliance with the requirements of the ordinance do inhibit the achievement of the
objectives as stated, including orderly development, given the unique circumstances of
the subject property. Alternatively, the variances being granted do not impede or be
detrimental to the public welfare, or injurious to the public welfare or be injurious to
other property in the area, will not violate the provisions ofIdaho Code, nor will nullifY
the interest and purpose of the Ordinance or Comprehensive Plan."
In its second decision, under the heading "FINDINGS OF FACT" (beginning at R. p.
142) the P&Z Commission detailed its evidence and findings, most of which is applicable to a
finding that neighboring properties will not be injured. Again, due to the length those findings
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and conclusions are not re-printed here. Those findings conclude with the following:
11.

Would strict compliance with the requirements of the Ordinance result in
inhibiting the achievement of the objectives of the Ordinance, or nullify the
purpose of the Ordinance or the Comprehensive Plan.
a.

The purpose of the subdivision ordinances in general are set forth in
Article I, Section C of the Subdivision Ordinance and is not re-printed
here. The Commission finds strict compliance with the requirements of
the ordinance do inhibit the achievement of the objectives as stated,
including orderly development, given the unique circumstances of the
subject property. Alternatively, the variances being granted to (sic) not
impede or be detrimental to the public welfare, or injurious to the public
welfare or be injurious to other property in the area, will not violate the
provisions of Idaho Code, nor will nullify the interest and purpose of the
Ordinance or Comprehensive Plan. (R. p. 146)

V.

CONCLUSION:

Clearwater County's grant of variances to the subdivision ordinances relating to access
roads to the Galloways was not in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, made in
excess of statutory authority of the agency, made upon unlawful procedure or arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion.

The County went to great pains to ensure a proper process

and proper consideration of elements as established by County ordinance. This includes an
approach to reach a delicate balance between the jurisdiction of the District Court and the
obligations on the County with respect to the scope and nature of the easement at issue.
The Appellants reliance to support their position on zoning law is misplaced, both in their
application ofI.C. 67-6516 and in their reliance on zoning court decisions arising from
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application ofLC. 67-6516.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the County's grant of variances.
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